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THIS LAND IS OUR LAND, OR COEUR D'ALENE TRIBE
OF IDAHO V. STATE OF IDAHO
Pamela D. Bucy*
I. INTRODUCTION
When the United States government wanted to buy the lands of his
exhausted and defeated people, Chief Seattle responded with a natural
eloquence stemming from his oral tradition:'
We love this earth as a newborn loves its mother's heartbeat. If we sell
you our land, care for it as we have cared for it. Hold in your mind the
memory of the land as it is when you receive it. Preserve the land and
the air and the rivers for your children's children and love it as we have
loved it.2
Chief Seattle's speech exemplifies his innocence regarding the ramifi-
cations of property ownership. The immediate occupation of the land by
white settlers quickly brought home a full understanding of the Western
concept of land ownership to the Native American People.
Invasion of tribal sovereignty, often by immense federal and state
regulatory agencies has forced tribes to accept the concept of ownership
and to operate within its parameters.3 Recently tribes have begun to assert
ownership rights over minerals, hunting and fishing, timber, and water
throughout their reservations Generally these claims are based upon the
treaties which established the reservations.5 In order to establish exclusive
ownership, tribes are filing quiet title actions against the states in which
their reservations are located.6 Coeur d'Alene Tribe of Idaho v. State of
Idaho7 is one such action. The Ninth Circuit's holding may provide guid-
* J.D., 1998, University of Montana School of Law, Missoula, MT; B.A. Political Sci-
ence/History, B.A. English, 1991, Rocky Mountain College, Billings, MT.
1. SUSAN JEFFERS, BROTHER EAGLE, SISTER SKY - A MESSAGE FROM CHIEF SEATTLE 25
(1991).
2. Id. at 20-21.
3. See Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544 (1981) (Crow tribe declares ownership of the
Big Horn River bed in an attempt to gain regulatory control over non-Indian hunting and fishing with-
in the border of the reservations).
4. See, e.g., Id.; Memon v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130 (1982).
5. See Montana, 450 U.S. at 544 (relying on treaties which created its reservation, the Tribe
claimed authority to prohibit hunting and fishing by nonmembers of the Tribe even on lands within
the reservation owned in fee simple by non-Indians).
6. See, e.g., Manypenny v. United States, 948 F.2d 1,057 (1991); Hamson v. Hickel, 6 F.3d
1347 (1993).
7. Coeur d'Alene Tribe of Idaho v. State of Idaho, 42 F.3d 1244 (9th Cir. 1994), cert. grant-
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ance for tribes seeking to exercise the kind of ownership and control over
their reservations that eluded Chief Seattle but is so necessary in today's
world. This case note will present the procedural facts of Coeur d'Alene
and explain the court's holding, focusing exclusively on the holding
against the defendant state officials in their individual capacity Finally,
this note will attempt to predict how the Supreme Court is likely to rule
on this decision.
II. FACTS
On November 8, 1873, President Grant issued an Executive Order
establishing a reservation in the Idaho Temtory for the Coeur d'Alene
Tribe.8 Congress then ratified this Executive Order.9 The Tribe claims
that this Order gives them beneficial interest in the beds and banks of all
navigable water within the reservation, including the submerged land
under Lake Coeur d'Alene, subject only to the trusteeship of the United
States. "
In Coeur d'Alene Tribe of Idaho v State of Idaho, the Coeur d'Alene
Indian Tribe ("the Tribe") filed a complaint in federal district court in
Idaho naming the State of Idaho, Idaho State Board of Land Commission-
ers, Idaho State Department of Water, and several state officials, both
individually and in their official capacity, as defendants." The complaint
sought an order quieting title in favor of the Tribe to the beds, banks, and
waters of all navigable water, including Lake Coeur d'Alene, within the
boundaries of its reservation."2 The Tribe claimed ownership through an
Executive Order, which created the reservation, 3 and in the alternative
through unextinguished aboriginal title. 4 The Complaint also sought a
declaratory judgment designating the land and water in question for the
exclusive use, occupancy, and enjoyment of the Tribe. 5 The complaint
further requested that the court declare invalid all Idaho statutes and ordi-
nances regulating the disputed lands and waters, and enjoin the State of
Idaho, its agencies, and officials from taking any action regulating or
affecting the Tribe's right to the lands and waters. 6
In response, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds
ed, 116 S. Ct. 1415 (1996).
8. Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe of Idaho, 117 S. Ct. 2028, 2049 (1997).
9. Id.
10. Id., See also Act of Mar. 3, 1891, ch. 543, § 19, 26 Stat. 1026-1029.
1I. Id. at 1247.
12. Id.
13. Exec. Order, ch. 543 § 19, 26 Stat. 989, 1026-29 (1891).
14. Coeur d'Alene, 42 F.3d at 1247.
15. Coeur d'Alene Tribe of Idaho v. State of Idaho, 798 F Supp. 1443, 1445 (D. Idaho 1992).
16. Id.
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that the action was barred by the Eleventh Amendment 7 and the com-
plaint failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. 8 The
district court held that the Eleventh Amendment prohibited all claims
against Idaho and its agencies.' 9 Finding the quiet title and declaratory
relief retroactive in nature, the court concluded the Eleventh Amendment
barred the action because it was equivalent to seeking damages." Finally,
following the rationale of Montana v. United States,2' the district court
declared the Tribe's claim to title indefensible.' This ruling allowed the
court to dismiss the claim for injunctive relief against the officials because
the complaint failed to state a violation of federal law Violation of federal
law was the exception to Eleventh Amendment Immunity, established in
Ex Parte Young, 2 on which that cause of action was based.24 The Tribe
appealed.'
I. HOLDING
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals agreed with the district court, and
affirmed the part of its ruling which stated that the Eleventh Amendment
barred all claims against the State of Idaho and its agencies, as well as the
quiet title action against the state officials.26 However, the Ninth Circuit
reversed and remanded the district court's dismissal of the declaratory and
injunctive relief sought against the state officials, thus also reversing the
lower court's holding that the Tribes failed to state a claim.27 The appel-
late court held that the injunctive and declaratory relief sought by the
Tribe against the state officials did not constitute damages, but instead
precluded future violations of federal law, and therefore was not barred by
Eleventh Amendment immunity 28
Relying on Florda Department of State v. Treasure Salvors, Inc.,29
17. U.S. CONST. amend. XI (stating that the judicial power of the United States does not extend
to cases commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another state, or
citizens of a foreign state).
18. Coeur d'Alene I, 798 F. Supp. at 1445.
19. Coeur d'Alene, 42 F.3d at 1247.
20. Id.
21. Montana, 450 U.S. at 544. (supreme Court held that submerged lands presumptively passed
to the state upon entry into Union, unless affirmative, pre-statehood action, in favor of the Tribe, de-
feats state title).
22. Coeur d'Alene, 42 F.3d at 1247.
23. Ex Pane: Edward T. Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908) (permits a suit against a state official that
provides injunctive relief to vindicate constitutional rights).




28. Id. at 1254.
29. State of Florida, Dept. of State v. Treasure Salvors, Inc., 689 F.2d 1254 (5th Cir. 1982) (the
1998]
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the Court of Appeals concluded that if, upon remand, the district court
finds that the property at issue belongs to the Tribe under the federal
Executive Treaty, it may declare the Tribe the owner of the disputed prop-
erty against everyone except the State of Idaho.3" If this is so declared,
the Tribe will then have the right to prohibit state officials from interfering
with their possessory interest in the property However, it will not hold
clear title to the disputed property "' The Court of Appeals reacted to this
apparent dilemma by stating:
Our conclusion undoubtedly will not satisfy any of the parties involved.
However, just as we may not exercise jurisdiction over the state to more
fully resolve this controversy, we may not decline jurisdiction to the
extent that it exists. (citations omitted.) We will not refuse to enforce the
federal rights of Indian tribes against action by state officials merely
because we cannot afford them complete relief."
The State of Idaho appealed this decision to the Supreme Court.33 Recog-
nizing the potential impact of this decision on state sovereignty, twenty-
three states, including Montana, and various government agencies filed
amicus briefs on behalf of the State of Idaho.34
IV DISCUSSION OF PRIOR LAW
The Eleventh Amendment was created in reaction to a Supreme Court
opinion which construed Article III, Section 2," of the Constitution to
give the Supreme Court original jurisdiction over a suit brought by a
South Carolina citizen against the State of Georgia.36 The Supreme
Court's decision to accept jurisdiction "created such a shock of surprise
that the Eleventh Amendment was at once proposed and adopted. 37
The Eleventh Amendment states:
Court quieted title to artifacts in favor of treasure hunters against everyone except the State of Flori-
da).
30. Coeur d'Alene, 42 F.3d at 1255.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Petitioners' Brief at 1, Coeur d'Alene Tribe of Idaho v. State of Idaho, 42 F.3d 1244 (9th
Cir. 1994).
34. Telephone Conversation with Steven W Strack, Deputy Attorney General, State of Idaho,
February 26, 1997.
35. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 (stating that the judicial power shall extend to all cases in Law and
Equity between a State and a citizen of another state).
36. Pennhurst State School & Hospital v. Haldernan, 465 U.S. 89, 97 (1984) (citing Chisolm v.
Georgia, 2 Dall. 419, 1 L.Ed. 1282 (1934)).
37. Id. (quoting Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313, 325 (1934)).
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The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend
to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the
United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of
any Foreign State."
"The Eleventh Amendment stands not so much for what it says, but
for the presupposition of our constitutional structure which it confirms:
that the States entered the federal system with their sovereignty 139
Thus, with limited exception, a state's sovereign immunity as recognized
by the Eleventh Amendment bars suit against it in federal courts.
A. Eleventh Amendment Exceptions
Despite this broad interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment, states
have not escaped suits in federal courts, as the courts recognized several
exceptions to Eleventh Amendment immunity 4 The Supreme Court held
that a state may waive its Eleventh Amendment immunity by expressly
consenting to a waiver of immunity, or impliedly, by an act of Congress
which clearly abrogates state immunity, or if the case falls within the Ex
Parte Young4 doctrine.42
1. Express Consent
A state waives Eleventh Amendment immunity upon unequivocal
consent to be sued.43 Only legislative enactment, stating the state's clear
intention to subject itself to suit m federal court, constitutes an express
waiver or consent to suit.44
2. Plan of Convention or Implied Waiver
If a state does not expressly waive its sovereign immunity, a court
may find an implied consent or waiver in order to bypass Eleventh
38. U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
39. Blatchford v. Native Village of Noatak, 501 U.S. 775, 779 (1991).
40. Marc S. Feinstein, Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe v. South Dakota, Indian Gaming, and the
States Eleventh Amendment Immunity: Where Will the Conflict in the Circuits Fuse?, 39 S.D.L. Rev.
604, 623-624 (1994)
41. Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. at 168 (permits a suit against a state official that provides injunc-
tive relief to vindicate constitutional rights).
42. Feinstein, supra note 40, at 624.
43. Pennhurst, 465 U.S. at 99.
44. Amber J. Ahola, "Call It Revenge of the Pequots," or How American Indian Tribes Can
Sue States Under the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act Without Violating the Eleventh Amendment, 27
U.S.F L. Rev. 907, 917 (1993).
1998]
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Amendment immunity " This theory begins with the premise that states
impliedly gave up certain rights to the federal government upon entering
the Union.' Referred to as the "plan of convention" theory,47 it states
that "by entering a field of economic activity that is federally regulated,
the state impliedly consent[s] to be bound by that regulation and to be
subject to suit in federal court."48 Abrogating a state's Eleventh Amend-
ment immunity using this doctrine requires Congress to clearly and un-
equivocally void state immunity and requires the state to enter a field of
economic activity regulated by the federal government.49 However, the
Court in Blatchford v Native Village of Noatak, held that the "plan of
convention" theory did not apply to suits brought by Indian tribes against
states.50
3. The Ex Parte Young Doctrine
The Ex Parte Young doctrine is not technically an exception to a
state's Eleventh Amendment immunity because it actually deals with the
actions of state officials, not with actions of the state.5' This doctrine,
however, has been used effectively to overcome Eleventh Amendment
immunity 52
In 1906, the Minnesota Railroad Commission, by way of legislative
acts, implemented a price fixing plan for the carrage of various classes of
merchandise.53 The passage of the acts resulted in the filing of nine equi-
ty suits in federal circuit court.54 The suits, brought by stockholders of
the respective railroad companies, named numerous defendants including
Edward T Young, the Attorney General of the State of Minnesota. 5 One
purpose of the suits was to enjoin Young from enforcing the provisions of
the acts or instituting any action or proceeding against the railway com-
45. Id.




49. Ahola, supra note 44, at 918.
50. Blatchford, 501 U.S. at 782-84. The Court held that it was the "mutuality of the conces-
sion" upon entering the Union that created this waiver between sister states. Thus, tribes could not
possibly have consented as they were not parties to the constitutional convention. The Court further
reasoned that if states were unable to sue tribes because of this lack of mutual consent, tribes also
lacked the ability to sue states. Id.
51. Ahola, supra note 44, at 916 n.70.
52. See, e.g., Florida Dep't of State v. Treasure Salvors, Inc., 458 U.S. 670 (1982); Pennhurst,
465 U.S. at 102; Almond Hill Sch. v. United States Dep't of Agric., 768 F.2d 1030, 1034 (1985).
53. Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. at 128.
54. Id. at 129.
55. Id.
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pany and its officers.56
The circuit court issued a temporary restraining order against Attor-
ney General Young.57 Young promptly moved to dismiss all claims
against him on the ground of Eleventh Amendment immunity, stating that,
as Attorney General of the State of Minnesota, a suit against him was
essentially a suit against the state.58 Nevertheless, the court granted the
temporary injunction against Young.59
Following the injunction, Young filed a petition in state court re-
questing an order to compel compliance with the acts.' After this order
was issued and served upon the Northern Railway Company,6' the federal
circuit court ordered Young to show cause why he should not be punished
for contempt.62 Young's answer stated the same Eleventh Amendment
argument set out in his earlier Motion to Dismiss.6" A contempt order
was issued against Young.'
On appeal, the Supreme Court held that the acts passed by the Min-
nesota legislature were unconstitutional.6" The Court then held that a suit
challenging the constitutionality of a state official's action was not one
against the state; therefore the Eleventh Amendment did not prevent feder-
al courts from issuing equitable relief.' The Court reasoned that a state
official acted without state authority when he enforced a law that violated
an individual's constitutional rights.67 The doctrine attempts to honor
state sovereignty with this narrowly tailored exception, while at the same
time give life to tie idea of federal supremacy under the Supremacy
Clause.
4. The Ex Parte Young Doctrine and Property Claims
In 1897, the Supreme Court held that the Eleventh Amendment did
not bar real property claims against state officials.68 The Supreme Court
extended the exception to personal property cases.69 In Treasure Salvors,
treasure hunters filed an action seeking a declaration of title to an aban-




60. Id. at 133.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 134.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 149.
66. Id. at 159.
67. Id.
68. Tindal v. Wesley, 167 U.S. 205 (1897).
69. Treasure Salvors, 458 U.S. at 685-89.
19981
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doned ship located on the ocean floor off the Florida Keys and enjoining
Florida Archive officials from releasing artifacts from the ship.7" Recog-
nizing the delicate balance required to maintain state sovereignty and
Federal Supremacy in property title disputes, the Supreme Court devel-
oped a middle ground approach in Treasure Salvors.7 The Court articu-
lated the following test to determine whether a suit against state officials
is barred by the Eleventh Amendment:
a. Is this action asserted against officials of the State or is it an action
against the State itself' b. Does the challenged conduct of state offi-
cials constitute an ultra vires or unconstitutional withholding of property
or merely a tortious interference with property rights? c. Is the relief
sought by [plaintiffs] permissible prospective relief or is it analogous to a
retroactive award that requires "the payment of funds from the state
treasury"72
Application of this test established two clear cut, although arguably
contrary, rules. First, federal courts may not hear quiet title actions in
which the state claims an interest in the property without state consent.73
Second, an action seeking to enjoin state officials from an ongoing viola-
tion of federal law is not precluded simply because the determination of
the issue might put the plaintiff in possession of the disputed property "
While the Court did not acknowledge the difficulty of logically reconciling
the two rules, it has since held that it is nevertheless bound by both.75
The Coeur d'Alene case clearly illustrates the difficulty of harmonizing
these two rules.
V ANALYSIS
In deciding the issue of whether declaratory and injunctive relief
against state officials was appropriate in Coeur d'Alene, the Ninth Circuit
meticulously followed the reasoning used by the Supreme Court in the
Treasure Salvors case. One important aspect of the court's decision is not
necessarily its analysis, but its willingness to make the analysis at all. The
court's examination of this issue is a strict analysis of Eleventh Amend-
ment immunity under Ex Parte Young and its progeny with no discussion
of federal Indian law
70. Id. at 670.
71. Id. at 685-89.
72. Id. at 690 (quoting Quem v. Jordon, 440 U.S. 332, 346-47 (1979)).
73. Id. at 685-89.
74. Id.
75. Coeur d'Alene, 42 F.3d at 1252.
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A. Application of the Treasure Salvors Test
The Ninth Circuit's desire to keep this case in federal court manifest-
ed itself in the court's diligent application of the three part test articulated
in Treasure Salvors. However, the Treasure Salvors case dealt with per-
sonal .property, not real property.76 At no time in its analysis did the
Coeur d'Alene court distinguish between the two. This deficiency resulted
in the court's failure to address adequately the possible effects of its hold-
ing on the State of Idaho's interest m the property
1. Is this an action asserted against officials of the state or is it an action
brought against the state itself?
Granting declaratory and injunctive relief in a quiet title action
against state officials claiming interest in the property undoubtedly impacts
a state's interest in the disputed property Acknowledging this difficulty,
the court stated that "the fiction that an action in violation of federal law
cannot be an action of the state breaks down when confronted by the
state's claim of title. to property "' The Coeur d'Alene court found that
states have a right to claim title to property in derogation of federal law
and still enjoy protection from suit by virtue of the Eleventh Amend-
ment.78 However, the court further concluded that this does not create an
exception to the rule that state officials are bound by the federal law when
there is a conflict between state and federal law "
The general criterion for determining when a suit against state offi-
cials is actually a suit against the state is the effect of the relief sought.8"
Suits seeking retroactive damages are barred by the Eleventh Amend-
ment.8' The court states that although this rule appears to bar relief, the
Ex Parte Young exception is applicable. 2 This exception provides that
state officials violating federal law are not deemed to be acting within
state authority, and thus are not shielded by state immunity 83 In reaching
its decision, the court failed to discuss the potential effect that its ruling
would have on the State of Idaho's interest in the property 84 Instead the
76. Treasure Salvors, 458 U.S. at 670. Treasure hunters sought a declaration of title to an aban-
doned ship and all artifacts from the ship and an injunction preventing Florida officials from releasing
any of the artifacts. Id.
77. Coeur d'Alene, 42 F.3d at 1254.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Pennhurst, 465 U.S. at 101.
81. Id. at 103.
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court found that the injunctive and declaratory relief sought by the Tribe
did not constitute damages, when it stated:
it seeks a determination under federal law of the Tribe's right to
possess, use, and control the beds, banks, and waters of navigable water-
ways within the Coeur d'Alene Reservation in the future. Thus to the
extent that the declaration and injunctive relief binds state officials in
accordance with what the district court finds to be the Tribe's right to the
property, it is allowable."5
A scenario in which this relief would not adjudicate the state's inter-
est in the property is difficult, if not impossible, to imagine. The State of
Idaho clearly understands the implications of the court's ruling. The State
argued that even though strict pnnciples of res judicata may not apply, as
the state is no longer a nominal party in the determination of this quiet
title dispute, an adjudication of title in favor of the tribe will be a practical
bar on any further assertions of state ownership of the property 86 Be-
cause such a holding from a federal court of appeals would serve as prece-
dent in all further proceedings, the state concludes that "for all practical
purposes the state would be forever foreclosed from asserting its sover-
eignty over the disputed property 87
Nevertheless, the Ninth Circuit refused to recognize this relief as
providing any kind of final adjudication on the State of Idaho's interest.8
The court stated that if the district court determines that the property be-
longs to the Tribe, it can declare the Tribe the owner against everyone
except the State of Idaho. It further concluded that even if the Tribe ulti-
mately prevails on the merits of the case, neither the Tribe nor Idaho will
hold clear title to the property
While formulating a remedy alleviating this dilemma would prove
difficult, it may be possible. The Ninth Circuit court did not address this
issue. Therefore, the task of separating this remedy from a direct adjudica-
tion of state title must either be tackled by the Supreme Court or left to
further litigation between the parties. Unfortunately for the Tribe, this
gives the Supreme Court little incentive to adhere to the strict Ex Parte
Young analysis established by the court of appeals.
85. Id. at 1255.
86. Petioners' Brief at 30, Coeur d'Alene Tribe of Idaho v. State of Idaho, 42 F.3d 1244 (9th
Cir. 1994).
87. Id.
88. Coeur d'Alene, 42 F.3d at 1255.
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2. Does the challenged conduct constitute an unconstitutional
withholding of property or merely tortious interference with property
rights?
The court rightly devoted only one paragraph to its analysis of this
element of the test.89 The court began with the general premise that state
officials acting within the scope of state law and violating no federal law
are protected by state Eleventh Amendment immunity o The court added
that the determination of whether federal rights have been violated often
requires" a trial on the merits.9' Thus, the court concluded that merely
alleging an unconstitutional withholding of property should satisfy this
prong of the test.' The Tribe's claim to ownership based upon a federal
treaty combined with the regulatory actions of the state officials consti-
tuted a sufficient allegation.93 To require plaintiffs to do more would de-
feat the purpose of notice pleading by forcing plaintiffs to prove much of
their case in the pleadings in order to get the case to trial.
3. Is the relief sought by the Plaintiffs permissible prospective relief or is
it analogous to a retroactive award, i.e. damages?
The court began its analysis of this prong by citing the general rule
that suits against state officials seeking relief, which is retrospective in
nature, such as damages, are prohibited by the Eleventh Amendment.94
Instead of focusing on the effect that a positive ruling in favor of the
Tribe would have on the State of Idaho, the court focused on the effect
that the proposed remedy would have on the Tribe. The court stated the
issue m this way-
Although it has often been stated that the Eleventh Amendment forbids
relief that would require the payment of funds from the state treasury,
the overriding question is whether the relief sought would remedy future
rather than past wrongs. An injunction that will in practical effect require
payment of funds out of the state treasury is nonetheless permissible if it
requires only that officials conform their future actions to federal law.95
By formulating the issue in this way, the court again escaped acknowledg-
ing the "practical effect" of the proposed remedy on the State of Idaho,





94. Id. at 1251 (citing Ulaleo v. Paty, 902 F.2d 1395, 1398 (9th Cir. 1990)).
95. Id. at 1252.
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and kept the case within the Ex Parte Young doctrine.
The court only touched on the effect its remedy would have on Idaho
in its attempt to follow the two contradictory rules established in Treasure
Salvors. The first of the Treasure Salvors rules states that federal courts
may not hear actions to quiet title to property in which the state claims an
interest without the state's consent.96 The second provides that declarato-
ry and injunctive relief against state officials to prevent future violations
of federal law is available even if that relief works to put the plaintiff in
possession of property also claimed by the state.97
The circuit courts are split over the application of these rules. Some
adhered to the Ex Parte Young doctrine and allowed suits enjoining state
officials from violating federal law in the quiet title context.9" Yet other
circuits held that declaratory and injunctive relief that necessarily involves
the adjudication of a state's property interest is comparable to damages
and is therefore precluded.' The Coeur d'Alene court concluded that
these holdings, barring injunctive and declaratory relief against state offi-
cials, were foreclosed by the Supreme Court precedent of Treasure
Salvors' second rule."° The Court held that "while the conflict between
the two rules presents a conceptual difficulty that perhaps cannot be re-
solved logically, we are nevertheless bound by both."'' As a result, the
court ruled that because the declaratory and injunctive relief sought by the
Tribe would not compensate for past violations of constitutional rights, but
would instead prevent future violations, the action against the state offi-
cials was not barred by state immunity '02
Although the court did not address how to best implement this reme-
dy, it did recognize the difficult position in which all parties would be left
subsequent to a trial on the merits declaring the Tribe the owner of the
disputed property '03 However, as this holding simply keeps the Tribe in
federal court, the court concluded by saying:
just as we may not exercise junsdiction over the state to more fully
resolve this controversy, we may not decline jurisdiction to the extent
that it exists. (citations omitted). We will not refuse to enforce the feder-
96. Treasure Salvors, 458 U.S. at 685-89.
97. Id.
98. See, e.g., id.
99. See, e.g., John G. & Marie Stella Kennedy Mem. Found. v. Mauro, 21 F.3d 667, 673 (5th
Cir. 1994); Fitzgerald v. Unidentified Wrecked & Abandoned Vessel, 866 F.2d 16, 17 n.1 (1st Cir.
1989); Harmson v. Hickel, 6 F.3d 1347, 1348 (9th Cir. 1993).
100. Coeur d'Alene, 42 F.3d at 1252.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 1254.
103. Id. at 1255.
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al rights of Indian tribes against action by state officials simply because
we cannot afford them complete relief."4
Even if the Supreme Court upholds the ruling of the appellate court, the
Tribe still faces the burden of proving ownership. However, the court of
appeals holding allows them to attempt to do so in a less biased forum,
federal court.
B. Applicable Indian Law and the Montana Presumption
In its rote application of the Treasure Salvors test, the court failed to
discuss the implications of the plaintiff's status as an Indian tribe. The Ex
Parte Young doctrine was established to protect an individual against state
violation of guaranteed federal rights. As the Couer d'Alene tribe is
technically a quasi-sovereign nation, the applicability of the doctrine is
unclear."° This issue was not addressed by the court. However, one un-
derlying policy surrounding the Ex Parte Young exception seeks to allow
disadvantaged plaintiffs to escape a forum adverse to the protection of
Constitutional rights.0 7 Indian tribes have historically received unfavor-
able treatment in state courts and this may account for the court's failure
to address the issue.'08
The court's approach was surprising given the settled case law sur-
rounding land title disputes available in the area of federal Indian law "
In 1823 in Johnson v. M'Intosh, the Court established that tribes did not
own fee title to their lands, but a lesser interest that the Court character-
ized as a "nght of occupancy "' A century later, in Montana v. United
States, the Court confirmed that in settling disputes over submerged lands,
courts must start with the presumption that the beds of navigable waters
remain in trust for future states and pass to the new states when they enter
the Union."'
104. Id.
105. Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. at 168.
106. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1 (1831) (holding that although the Cherokee tribe
succeeded in demonstrating that it was a "state" capable of managing its own affairs, the tribe could
not be considered a "foreign state" for the purposes of filing suit against Georgia. The Court instead
denominated Indian tribes as "domestic dependent nations").
107. Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. at 168.
108. United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375 (1886) (holding that because the citizens of the
States where reservations are located are often the tribes deadliest enemies because of historical ani-
mosity, major crimes should be tried in federal court).
109. See Montana, 450 U.S. at 553 (The Supreme Court held that the Federal Government holds
lands under navigable waters in trust for future States, to be granted to such States when they enter the
Union, and there is a strong presumption against conveyance of such lands by the United States).
110. Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. 543, 574 (1823).
111. Montana, 450 U.S. at 553.
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In Montana, the Crow Tribe claimed title to the submerged lands of
the Big Horn River by virtue of the treaty establishing its reservation."'
The Court rejected the Tribe's claim, holding that "the mere fact that the
bed of a navigable water lies within the boundaries described in the treaty
does not make the riverbed part of the conveyed land ,,113 The
Court added that there is a strong federal policy against conveyance, and,
therefore, unless there is evidence of some "international duty or public
exigency, submerged lands will not be held to have been conveyed.""' 4
Aware of the similarities with the Montana case, and that resolution
of the ownership question was inevitable, the Coeur d'Alene court pro-
ceeded to decide the Eleventh Amendment immunity issue. If invoked,
this presumption against Indian title would preclude an Eleventh Amend-
ment analysis. If there is no legitimate claim to ownership of the disputed
property based on a federal treaty, then the Tribe cannot allege an ongoing
violation of federal law Thus the case would no longer fall within the Ex
Parte Young exception.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Ninth Circuit's decision in Coeur d'Alene Tribe of Idaho v State
of Idaho does not give the Coeur d'Alene tribe title to the disputed land.
The Ninth Circuit, with its rote application of the Ex Parte Young doctrine
and its progeny, simply kept the Tribe in federal court. This decision
allows the Tribe to attempt to prove ownership in a forum which they
consider to be more favorable, or less biased. The Tribe, like any other
plaintiff whose federal rights have been violated, deserves such a forum.
Notwithstanding, the Tribe is not like any other individual plaintiff.
For 170 years, the Supreme Court has placed tribes in a separate category
from other plaintiffs and by doing so has developed an immense body of
federal Indian law The question is whether the Supreme Court will ana-
lyze the Coeur d'Alene case from an Indian law or an Ex Parte Young
perspective. If the Supreme Court begins its analysis with the Montana
presumption against Indian title, the Tribe is out of federal court. Because
the Ninth Circuit failed to address the effect of its holding on the State of
Idaho's interest in the property, the Supreme Court has little incentive to
follow the strict Ex Parte Young analysis used in Coeur d'Alene.
However, the Supreme Court should recognize the underlying policy,
assisting disadvantaged plaintiffs in the protection of constitutional rights,
behind Ex Parte Young and the need for a trial on the merits of ownership
112. Id. at 554.
113. Id.
114. Id.
COUER D'ALENE TRIBE V IDAHO
of the disputed property and follow the strict Ex Parte Young analysis
provided by the Ninth Circuit. Though the ramifications of ownership
were unclear to Chief Seattle, they are very clear to the Coeur d'Alene
Tribe and a dismissal of this action before a trial on the merits in federal
court will, for all practical purposes, destroy any chance the Tribe has to
exercise this modem understanding.
POSTSCRIPT
On June 23, 1997, the United States Supreme Court issued its deci-
sion in the case of Idaho v Coeur d'Alene Tribe of Idaho."5 Surpns-
ingly, the Supreme Court conducted an Ex Parte Young analysis in render-
ing its decision and did not invoke the Montana presumption." '6 Not sur-
prisingly and regardless of this fact, m a PLURALITY OPINION, the Court
reversed the Ninth Circuit's decision." 7 Justice Kennedy delivered the
opinion of the Court concluding that the Tribe's suit against the state offi-
cials could not proceed m federal court."8
The Court defined the scope of the Ex Parte Young doctrine. It found
that regardless of the fact that the officials had been named and served as
individuals, the State of Idaho would continue to have an interest in the
litigation because state policies and procedures were at issue."9 The
Court held that Eleventh Amendment immunity represents a real limitation
on a federal court's federal-question jurisdiction. The real interests served
by the Eleventh Amendment are not to be sacrificed to elementary me-
chanics of captions and pleading. Application of the Young exception must
reflect a proper understanding of its role in our federal system and respect
for state courts instead of reflexive reliance on an obvious fiction.' 20
The Court summarily dismissed the Tribes reliance on the Treasure
Salvors case finding that the state officials in Treasure Salvors were acting
beyond the scope of their state-conferred authority, a theory the Tribe did
not allege.'2 ' Next, the Court held that although an ongoing violation of
federal law is "ordinarily sufficient" to invoke the Young exception, the
Tribe's suit was essentially the equivalent of a quiet title action which
implicated special sovereignty issues.' Furthermore the "far-reaching
and invasive relief' sought by the Tribe would essentially shift all benefits
115. Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe of Idaho, 117 S. C. 2028 (1997).
116. Id. at 2040.
117. Id. at 2043.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 2034.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 2040.
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of ownership from the State to the Tribe.'23 The Court finally held that
courts, in determining the applicability of the Young, exception should
consider "whether there are 'special factors counseling hesitation."" 24
Thus, the Court determined that the applicability of the Young exception is
to be ascertained on a case by case basis. Finally holding,
[u]nder these particular and special circumstances, the Young exception
is inapplicable. The dignity and status of its statehood allows Idaho to
rely on its Eleventh Amendment immunity and to insist upon responding
to these claims in its own courts, which are open to hear and determine
the case.'
Justice O'Connor concurred with this judgment.'26 However, she
disagreed with the principal opinions holding that courts must engage in a
case specific analysis.'27 She felt that the principal opinion replaced a
straightforward inquiry into whether a complaint alleges an ongoing viola-
tion of federal law with a vague balancing test. 2 ' Justice O'Connor
found the fact that the Tribe sought "to divest the State of all regulatory
power over submerged lands, -in effect to quiet title to sovereign lands"
dispositive." 9 For Justice O'Connor this remedy took the case out of the
Young exception because it made it a suit against the state.
30
Unlike the principal opinion, however, Justice O'Connor realized that
the mere availability of a state forum should not be a weighty factor in
determining federal court jurisdiction.' 3 Notwithstanding, although she
alluded to the "adequacy" of the state forum, she did not recognize or
discuss the historically unfavorable treatment that tribes have received in
state forums.'32
The Dissent, authored by Justice Souter, disagreed with both the
principal opinion and Justice O'Connor, holding that "[t]his is a perfect
example of a suit for relief cognizable under Ex Parte Young."'33 Citing
United States v Lee, the Dissent held that a quiet title claim should not
displace the application of the Young exception.'34 In Lee, the Court held
123. Id.
124. Id. at 2039.
125. Id. at 2043.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 2045 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
128. Id. at 2047.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 2045.
132. Id. at 2056 n.1 I (Souter, J., dissenting).
133. Id. at 2049.
134. Id. at 2050 (citing United States v. Lee 106 U.S. 196 (1882)).
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federal officers to be subject to a possessory action for land claimed by
the United States on the basis of federal law ... The Dissent relying on
the Lee analysis, felt that the majority opinions sanctioned a kind of tyran-
ny which should be unavailable in a government which claims to protect
liberty and personal rights.'36 The Dissent found that this case was no
more or less the "functional equivalent" of an action against the state then
any other Young suit.'37 The Dissent concluded stating,
[n]one of the considerations that the principal opinion would weigh in the
course of its balancing process in this case is a legitimate reason for
questioning jurisdiction over state officials, and nothing about property
title or regulatory jurisdiction justifies the majority's exception to
Young's guarantee of a federal forum to a private federal claimant
against state officials.'
The Dissent, though, would have allowed the Tribe to proceed with
its claim in federal court. Nowhere in the Dissent's opinion was it noted
that this particular plaintiff was an Indian tribe. Again like the majority
opinions, the historical treatment of tribes in state courts was not noted.
Thus the implications of this case on tribes seem clear. Regardless of the
fact that tribes have consistently received unfavorable treatment in state
court, tribes will be forced to bring suit in often biased forums. As the
four Justice Dissent clearly points out, this case could fit within the Young
exception. The United States Supreme Court's decision in Idaho v Coeur
d'Alene Tribe of Idaho, represents yet another defeat for tribes in their
ongoing struggle for sovereignty
135. Lee, 106 U.S. at 204.
136. Idaho, 117 S. Ct. at 2050.
137. Id. at 2053.
138. Id. at 2059.
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